Joanna D. Bell: The Qur’anic Ḥanīfiyya and its Role as a Middle Nation (Ohio State University, 2012)

Joanna D. Bell: The Qur’anic Ḥanīfiyya and its Role as a Middle Nation

Abstract

This thesis examines the material which helps scholars understand the Qur’anic use of ḥanīf and arrives at an understanding of ḥanīf translated as “Gentile,” which I demonstrate reconciles the connotation of ḥanīf in the Qur’an with definitions found in the larger Semitic lexica. In order to give semantic meaning to the lexical findings, I group theories which frame signifier ḥanīf into three differing signifieds: (1) a real-world religious group predating Islam in Arabia; (2) Urmonotheism, that is, indication of the existence of an original monotheism in Arabia; (3) an allusion to the mythical status of Abraham as the first monotheist as a legitimization of Muhammad’s message.
I address these three signifieds in relation to my proposed interpretation of ḥanīf as “Gentile, non-Israelite,” showing that this interpretation is advantageous for understanding the arguments of the three signifieds encountered in other interpretations which are reflected in the text of the Qur’an. I then explicate the text surrounding each Qur’anic occurrence of ḥanīf and qualify the circumstances around which “Gentile” or ḥanīf is employed. Overall, the suggested interpretation “Gentile” will be demonstrated as reconcilable with the Qur’anic text, the Semitic lexica, and the social and religious context of Arabia.
I present a synthesis of al-ḥanīfiyya which shows that its major role was to function as a “middle nation,” as it is referred to in Q 2:143, in negotiation with the increasingly hostile Quraysh, Jewish and Christian groups. A ḥanīf was a Gentile whose appointed role was to reform the disunited society around it and conform its own religious community to a just and moderate standard, as a “middle nation.” The era in which ḥanīf occurs is immediately before and after the hijra, one in which Muhammad’s group and his message were under great scrutiny and persecution from all fronts. During this period of trial, al-ḥanīfiyya represents the early Islamic community’s social and religious position as a “middle nation” which attempted to mitigate controversy through employing the symbols of Abraham and his House, the Ka‘ba, two figures common to the Jews, Christians and Quraysh. Al-ḥanīfiyya was also a “middle nation” in the temporal sense, indicating that Muhammad’s nation and religion were at a middle point in their development, emphasizing elements common to the surrounding societies “so that men may have no argument against you [Muhammad and his followers], save such as them do injustice….so that I [God] may complete My grace upon you,” an indication that al-ḥanīfiyya belonged to a transitional stage within the dynamic development of Muhammad’s message.

Lianfa Li: Prudential Banking Regulation and Monetary Policy (Ohio State University, 2004)

Lianfa Li: Prudential Banking Regulation and Monetary Policy (Ohio State University, 2004)

Abstract
Central bankers know that financial intermediation is important for achieving macroeconomic stability. Without a functioning banking system, an economy will grind to a halt. But monetary policy and prudential supervisory policy can work at cross-purposes. While monetary policymakers want to ensure that there is always sufficient lending activity to maintain high and stable economic growth, bank supervisors work to limit banks' lending capacities in order to prevent excessive risk-taking. To avoid working at cross-purposes, central bankers need to adopt a policy strategy that accounts for the impact of capital adequacy requirements. For this purpose, I derive an optimal monetary policy (in chapter 2) that reinforces prudential capital requirements and stabilizes aggregate economic activities at the same time. In chapter 2, I also find empirical evidence that in the United States the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates by more when the bank capital constraint binds during downturns, which is consistent with the theory. In contrast, central bankers in Germany and Japan clearly do not adjust interest rate policy in a way that would neutralize the procyclical impact of bank capital requirements. On the other hand, it is the job of bank regulators and supervisors to ensure that the financial system functions smoothly. Despite the consensus that moral hazard is a main cause for significant banking sector problems, policymakers can not reach an agreement on how to design optimal prudential banking policies. In particular, little is known about how existing banking policies, such as capital adequacy requirements and deposit insurance, complement one another. By constructing a dynamic model of moral hazard with endogenous franchise values in chapter 3, I not only argue that a coordinated combination of optimal bank capital requirements and optimal deposit insurance can control moral hazard efficiently but also derive analytically the forms of optimal banking policies. In this model, more competition stimulates risk-taking by banks but risk-taking decreases when capital regulation and deposit insurance are conducted. Based on the bank data from 43 countries during the 1990s, I find evidence that both deposit insurance and capital adequacy requirements enhance banking stability.